The system of manning used prior to the latest decisions by the Russian Government were made effective no longer meets contemporary requirements. Many experts were rightfully concerned that it would not ensure adequate manning levels and maintain the required military strength of the state after 2005. There are several reasons for this situation: the shortage of the draft-age manpower, liberal legislation allowing about 90 percent of eligible young men to avoid conscription, etc.

Due account is also to be taken of the fact that 2005 will mark the beginning of the country's slide into a demographic "pit", with the latter getting deeper every subsequent year until 2010.

The abovementioned factors call for crucial changes in the army recruitment pattern. Failure to accomplish such changes will make it impossible to maintain combat readiness of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation at the required level. The decisions recently adopted by the Government have radically changed the situation in this area. Partial transition of the country's Armed Forces to the contract-based pattern of recruitment is neither a politically-motivated declaration nor the end goal of the Armed Forces' development. It is one in a range of measures taken to enhance combat efficiency of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and ensure a level of competence allowing them to successfully meet any challenges to national security in compliance with the orders of the President of the Russian Fede-ration.

Partial transition of the Armed Forces to the contract-based recruitment pattern is not considered as the aim of their development and improvement but as a tool instrumental in enhancing the country's defence potential as well as combat readiness of its Armed Forces. The decision to introduce the contract-based recruitment pattern in some units and formations of the Armed Forces is not a politically-motivated declaration made without due consideration of financial and organizational implications. Rather, it is a result of a long painstaking evaluation of the nation`s objective capabilities.

The main objectives of the ongoing reform in the army recruitment system are as follows:

to set up a centralized, structurally optimized and permanently guided system of recruitment of contract servicemen to the troops (forces) of the country's military organization;

to improve the legislation regulating the activity of the federal bodies of executive authority related to all aspects of introducing the contract-based system of manning with soldiers, sailors, sergeants and sergants major;

to optimize the planning methods employed in transition to the new recruitment system, as well as respective phases of its implementation and deadlines set for building up contract-based manning levels to required strength, taking proper consideration of the economic and social situation in the country, and economic development forecasts;

stage-by-stage reorganization of the existing system of recruitment, selection, enrollment, training and re-training of contract servicemen;

improvement of the social infrastructure of military service to attract contract personnel.

The initial experience in manning the Armed Forces with contract servicemen shows that two major conditions are to be met to ensure successful implementation of the army recruitment reform:

adequate and steady funding and availability of skilled contract personnel. Current practices display a high personnel turnover among the contract

servicemen. This means that, as things stand now, the latter do not represent the best segment of the country's youth. At present, the majority of contract enlistees comprise people who have, for various reasons, failed to fulfil themselves in civil life.

In view of that, in 2003, the Federal target Program of transition to recruiting contract servicemen to some military units and formations in 2004-2007 was drawn up. Primarily, the Program envisages fundamental positive shifts in public opinion regarding the state's military structure and servicemen of all categories, allocation of the necessary financial and material resources for the adequate and timely remuneration of their service, and establishment of attractive working and living conditions for them.

The program was developed by the Defence Ministry, Economic Development and Trade Ministry, Finance Ministry and other ministries and agencies authorized by law to maintain a military force. An interdepartmental working group, including representatives of the Finance Ministry, was set up to hammer out provisions of the Program. Members of the group went to various permanent readiness units and formations to analyze the situation on the spot. They also estimated the costs incurred by the introduction of the contract-based recruitment pattern in these units. The group's estimate of federal budget allocations required for the implementation of a vast range of items necessary for meeting the program's objectives (within the Government-approved parameters) originally averaged 139.3 billion rubles. Later, with due regard to the Finance Ministry's opinion, the funds to be released for the implementation of the program were substantially scaled down to 79.1 billion rubles, with military units and formations under the jurisdiction of the Special Construction Ministry and Railways Ministry excluded from the overall military contingent assigned for transition to the contract-based recruitment pattern.

The program envisages the allocation of 64.2 billion rubles for social security and army appeal building measures, and 14.9 billion rubles for strengthening combat readiness of the units and formations to be transferred to the contract -based recruitment pattern.

From 2004 to 2007 the program plans to introduce the new recruitment practices in as many as 80 military units and formations with the numerical strength of 147,500 men, including 72 formations and one unit of the Armed Forces, 3 formations of the Federal Frontier Service, and 5 formations of the internal troops of the Interior Ministry.

In annual terms the respective figures for planned allocations and the numerical strength of contract servicemen who were enlisted or are due to be enlisted appear the following:

2004 - RUR 9.7 billion; 15,700 men;

2005 - RUR 20.9 billion; 54,500 men;

2006 - RUR 21.7 billion; 26,800 men;

2007 - RUR 26.8 billion; 50,600 men;

To set up basic incentives for would-be contract servicemen, the Program envisages raising the monthly bonus paid for combat training in special conditions to 3,300 rubles per serviceman, for those deployed in the Chechen Republic the bonus will be raised still further - to 5,000 rubles a month (in total, a first-year private of the enlisted personnel is to receive about 6,000 rubles a month, the one deployed in the Chechen Republic - 15,000 rubles a month).

The current benefits exempting contract servicemen and members of their families from paying fares when en route to pre-declared holiday destinations, which were established by the applicable legislation, are to be replaced with compensatory travel allowances.

The implementation of the Program will help improve combat training standards and prevent the dispatch of conscripted sergeants and privates to the Chechen Republic.

The contract-based recruitment pattern is going to be introduced step by step following the creation of the necessary infrastructure, with the permanent readiness units and formations of the Armed Forces, Interior Ministry and Federal Frontier Service deployed in the North Caucasus to pioneer the transition. Contract servicemen are to make up the core of the highly-skilled sergeant strength in the Armed Forces. Establishment of the professional sergeant corps aims to radically upgrade combat training standards and maintain military discipline.

The implementation of the above measures will let the Armed Forces optimize its system of recruiting contract personnel in the context of the ongoing modernization of the Armed Forces conducted to ensure qualitative and quantitative improvement of the enlisted personnel.

The gradual transition to the new recruitment pattern will go in tandem with consistent reduction of the length of conscripted service. The duration of draft service will be contingent on the number of available draftees in the country. By plan, the compulsory serwice period is to be reduced to 12 months, starting 2008. Among other things, this move will require the establishment of an optimal ratio between different categories of servicemen in the peacetime military strength and trained reserve. The realization of the targeted Federal program will allow the state to initiate a substantial cutback of the mobilization reserve.

At the same time, the implementation of the program for the partial introduction of the contract-based recruitment pattern in Russia's Armed Forces does not eliminate the necessity to keep and improve the mobilization reserve system.

The need to maintain a mobilization reserve of various classes arises from a requirement to have manning resources capable of ensuring prompt reinforcement of the Russian Armed Forces in case the efforts made by the permanent readiness forces to deter or suppress an armed conflict fail to yield positive results. To secure guaranteed availability of sufficient and well-trained mobilization personnel for manning the troops (forces) in such situations, the state must develop a new system of training and maintaining an adequate mobilization strength.